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GLOBAL CORRUPTION AND THE COURTS:
ENDING THE FCPA FREE-RIDING
by
John Paul*

INTRODUCTION
After dealing with extensive political corruption, the
United States (U.S.) in 1977 sought to regain its tarnished
international reputation by passing the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act (FCPA), which criminalized the business bribes of foreign
officials.1 However, the initial FCPA only prosecuted U.S.
corporations and individuals and ignored foreign corporations
and individuals, which resulted in a competitive disadvantage
for U.S. entities operating in the international markets.2 This led
to Congress amending the FCPA in 1998
jurisdiction to foreign corporations and individuals.3 Under the
amended FCPA, U.S. agencies were statutorily authorized to
U.S. citizens.4
The amended FCPA led to an increase in the prosecution
of both domestic and foreign entities and individuals over the
last decade.5 As a result of the amended FCPA, the U.S. has been
vulnerable to criticism from the global community.6 The
problem with the FCPA is the broad language that permits U.S.
government agencies to bring charges against entities and
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individuals whose alleged illegal conduct has no connection to
the U.S.7 This problem is exacerbated by the fact that few
entities and individuals have challenged
language, so there is little judicial precedent to limit the U.S.
authority.8
While the growth in enforcement activity has turned
FCPA investigation and compliance work into lucrative big
business for major U.S. law firms, it has reignited concerns
about an adverse impact on U.S. business abroad.9 Segments of
U.S. businesses insist that the FCPA places them at a
competitive disadvantage and even the U.S. Chamber of
enforcement.10 A number of reform advocates have argued that
the enforcement of anti-bribery rules by foreign governments
has been minimal despite the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) convention.11
FCPA compliance costs can be quite large. These costs
include the investigation of alleged illicit payments, the costs of
prevention programs as well as the costs of the FCPA accounting
rules.12 A large number of these costs entail significant fixed
components, making them lower on a per unit basis for larger
companies, giving them a competitive advantage over their
smaller counterparts.13 Similarly, larger companies are more
likely to employ in-house specialists who can absorb FCPA
compliance tasks into their existing work. It becomes more
probable that larger companies gain a distinct competitive
advantage over small and medium-sized companies as a result
of FCPA requirements. Furthermore, many new companies may
find that FCPA enforcement creates more entry barriers for
them.14
The purpose of this Note is to examine the claims that
the FCPA has been applied in an aggressive and overbroad
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manner against entities and individuals, even when their
connections to the U.S. have been minimal. A number of FCPA
cases were selected and analyzed to determine whether a FCPA
prosecution was warranted given the facts and the evidence.
Specifically, the slightness of the jurisdictional nexus was
examined to determine whether the U.S. had the jurisdiction to
investigate and prosecute entities and individuals under the
FCPA.
FCPA ENFORCEMENT ABROAD: DOES IT GO TOO
FAR?
As the world continues to grow smaller and business
expands, corporate executives must become more familiar with
the FCPA; otherwise, they face a grave risk. A World Economic
Forum survey of 11,232 business managers in 125 nations
reveals that nearly one-third of managers report that firms like
theirs bribe to secure government contracts.15 The percentage of
firms who supposedly bribe to secure government contracts
ranges from 13 percent in high-income OECD nations to 50
percent in low-income nations.16
Either internal or external actors can curb foreign
corruption in a nation. A nation can prosecute its own bribery
cases or it can coordinate cross-border investigations by other
nations. The FCPA is an example of the latter.17 The U.S. is not
the only nation that prosecutes foreign corruption cases. The
United Kingdom also pursues extraterritorial foreign bribery
prosecution under the United Kingdom Bribery Act of 2010.
However, due to its longer history, the FCPA provides more
cases for analysis.18
to foreign officials.

19

-bribery provision criminalizes bribes
Under the FCPA, foreign bribery in
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general is the act of offering a foreign official payment in
exchange for some type of business advantage.20 The antibribery provision covers three types of actors: issuers, domestic
concerns and any person who violates the provision while
corruptly using U.S. instrumentalities in U.S. territories.21
The coverage of multiple actors has given the U.S. a
powerful and flexible tool for prosecuting foreign actors for
bribery. As an example, foreign corporations can be issuers for
FCPA purposes. Since foreign shares can be traded in U.S.
markets as American Depository Receipts (ADR), the issuing
foreign corporation becomes an issuer under the jurisdiction of
the FCPA.22 In the absence of ADR, FCPA violations can occur
in the U.S. just by routing the funds through a U.S. bank.23
Many have claimed that the number of FCPA cases
prosecuted with questionable nexus is quite large.24 Of the
thirty-nine OECD member nations, the U.S. has prosecuted the
most corruption schemes with 128 cases, which constitutes over
25% of total prosecutions. The second highest is Germany,
which has only prosecuted 26 cases.25
Here are a number of FCPA cases that have been questioned on
their merits:
The Azerbaijan Oil Privatization Case: U.S. v. Kozeny26
Frederic Bourke co-founded Dooney & Bourke, the
company known for its line of fine handbags and other leather
accessories.27 In the 1990s, Bourke met Viktor Kozeny, known
, who collected tens of millions of
dollars after paying bribes to government officials in relation to
the privatization of state-owned industries in the Czech
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Republic.28
reputation.29
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan
reclaimed its independence in 1991 and began to privatize
government assets. One target for privatization was the
government-owned oil company, State Oil Company of the
Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) and the method proposed was
the voucher-based initiative.30 The Azerbaijani government
provided each citizen a voucher book with four coupons, which
could be freely sold and they usually sold for about $12.00.
Foreigners interested in participating in the auctions were
required to redeem their vouchers with options issued by the
State Property Committee.31
In 1997, Kozeny invited Bourke to travel to Azerbaijan.
Kozeny then created two entities, the Minaret Group, an
investment bank, and Oily Rock, which purchased the
Azerbaijani government vouchers.32 Thomas Farrell was
recruited by Kozeny to assist in the purchase of the vouchers.
Farrell purchased the vouchers with U.S. currency flown in on
private jets from Zurich or Moscow and eventually, $200 million
worth of vouchers were purchased.33
Kozeny and Farrell then met with the son of the
Azerbaijani President, Ilham Aliyev, as well as the SOCAR vice
president. Aliyev introduced Kozeny and Farrell to Nadir
Nasibov, State Property Committee Chair, and Barat Nuriyev,
Deputy Chair.34 Kozeny told Nurivyev that he wanted to
purchase SOCAR, which required a presidential decree. As part
of the plan to purchase SOCAR, Kozeny and Nuriyev agreed
that future voucher purchases would be made through Nurivev
to be paid
to Azerbaijani officials, including President Aliyev, in the
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amount of $8 million to $12 million. Kozemy agreed to pay this
35

vouchers and options be transferred to Azerbaijani officials so
the officials could reap
without having to invest any money. To facilitate this transfer,
Kozemy instructed his attorney, Hans Bodmer, to set up several
holding companies.36
President Aliyev then doubled the voucher requirement
from one million vouchers to two million vouchers and the
vouchers increased in price to $100 each. This forced Kozeny to
seek additional investors and he set up a lavish event at his home
in Aspen, Colorado, which Bourke attended. Kozeny then
escorted a group of potential investors to Azerbaijan, including
Bourke.37
Bourke questioned the attorney, Bodmer, about the
business plan and Bodmer supposedly told Bourke about the
bribery scheme. Bodmer report this conversation to Rolf
law firm. Schmid summarized
the conversation in a memorandum.
After a number of transactions, Kozeny abandoned all
down the business and the Minaret Group fired most of its
employees. Bourke resigned from the advisory boards and
Kozeny told the investors that the vouchers were worthless.38
Around the same time, Bourke entered into a proffer agreement
with the U.S. Department of Justice, waived his attorney-client
privilege and instructed his attorneys to answer all questions in
the investigation. When Bourke was asked if Kozeny made any
corrupt payments, transfers or gifts to Azerbaijani officials,
Bourke denied all knowledge.39
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In 2005, Bourke and Kozeny were indicted. Kozeny
never faced trial and fled to the Bahamas. After three days of
deliberations, the jury convicted Bourke on the FCPA
conspiracy and false statements charges. Bourke appealed,
insisting that he never had any reason to believe Kozeny had
paid bribes but the appellate court foun
arguments were meritless.40 However, the trial judge later
case, it is still not entirely clear to me whether Mr. Bourke was
41

The Nigerian Who is the Bribe-Taker Case:
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jackson42
As an international corporation headquartered in Texas,
Noble Energy provides offshore drilling equipment and services
subsidiaries operated drilling riggs of the coast of Nigeria, where
the law requires rig owners to either pay permanent import
duties or else obtain a temporary import permit (TIP).43
TIPs allowing drilling rigs to operate in Nigerian waters
without paying any permanent import duties. The Nigerian
Customs Service (NCS) grants TIPs for rigs that will be in
Nigeria for up to a year. While the NCS may grant up to three 6month TIP extensions, once the permit and the extensions
expire, the rig must be exported from Nigeria.44 If the rig
operator wants to continue using the rig in Nigeria, s/he can
either convert it to permanent status and pay permanent duties
or export the rig and re-import it. Since the NCS does not deal
directly with rig owners, the owners have to submit an
application through a licensed customs agent.45
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In applying for a TIP or TIP extension, Noble would
typically obtain a price proposal from a customs agent and any
46

Noble did have an FCPA policy, which required all payments
made to a foreign government without receipts to be
Once the
CFO approved the payments, the customs agent could pay the
government officials. The customs agent would submit an
invoice to Noble in reimbursement of the money paid to the
Nigerian officials.47
The U.S. Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)
alleged that Noble authorized a customs agent to pay bribes to
Nigerian officials in order to obtain the false documents needed
to obtain TIPS.
violations regarding the fraudulent permits they obtained in
order to avoid import duties. It was alleged that Jackson and
Ruehlen approved numerous payments to the Nigerian
government with the knowledge that such payments were
bribes.48
The SEC alleged that several events put Jackson on
notice that the company was violating the FCPA. In 2003, the
Nigerian government assessed a penalty against Noble for
issuing false documents to obtain TIPs and in 2004, Jackson
received a company-wide internal audit report indicating that
employees did not understand the FCPA.49 The SEC also alleged
that Ruehlen was on notice that Noble was violating the FCPA.
In 2003 and 2004, Ruehlen worked on an audit of the West
Africa division, which revealed the use of false documentation
and payments of approximately $75,000 every two years in
order to obtain TIPs.50
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In their defense, Ruehlen and Jackson contended that the
FCPA requires a plaintiff to allege the identity of the foreign
official who has been bribed. They suggested that the SEC must
allege by name or at least by role and job responsibility the
foreign official who was corruptly influenced. The SEC
countered that there is nothing in the FCPA that requires
pleading of the identity of the foreign official involved with the
detail level the defendants advocated.51
The court reviewed the FCPA and its legislative history
and concluded that the language of the FCPA does not appear to
require that the identity of the foreign official involved be pled
with specificity. The FCPA terms make it unlawful to authorize
payments to any person, knowing that any portion of these
payments would be offered to a foreign official. The court found
it unnecessary to require the SEC to identify the name, job title
and the daily duties of those foreign officials.52
Ruehlen and Jackson also argued that the FCPA charges
should be dismissed because the SEC has failed to plead
sufficient facts that would support the inference that the
consistent that with their belief that the payments were
permissible facilitating payments.53 They further argued that the
SEC had not pled that they acted corruptly because it failed to
plead any violations of Nigerian law, and because both of them
had a good faith belief that they were acting lawfully.
Specifically, Jackson argued that he had good faith belief that
that the payments were legal as facilitating payments and
Ruehlen argued that he relied in good faith on the approval of
the payments of his supervisors, including Jackson.54
The court held that the SEC should amend its complaint
to plead sufficient facts to support the claim that in making the
payment, Ruehlen and Jackson had a corrupt motive or wrongful
purpose of influencing an official to misuse her/his position. The
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court then dismissed the case without prejudice and allowed the
SEC the opportunity to amend its complaint.55

The India Retaliatory Discharge Case:
Nollner v. Southern Baptist Convention56
Ron Nollner is a Tennessee resident with extensive
construction business experience. Nollner and his wife, Betty,
are members of the Southern Baptist community. In 2008, the
International Mission Board (IMB) of the Southern Baptist
Convention posted a vacancy for missionary work in New Delhi,
India.57
The IMB recruited candidates to manage construction of
a new office building in Delhi, a job which among other
responsibilities, required working with local companies,
obtaining the necessary permits and ensuring compliance with
engineering standards. This project was to last for a minimum of
two years and a maximum of three and the advertisement

58

The Nollners agreed to take the position after being
encouraged by IMB. They thought that the position would last
for at least three years. Mr. and Mrs. Nollner both quit their jobs
and sold most of their assets in anticipation of moving to India
for this extended period.59
When the Nollners arrived in New Delhi, they clearly
saw that the situation was not as advertised. The planning and
permitting phase of the construction project had already been
the architect or contractor until the project was well under way.
Over the next several months, Mr. Nollner noticed the
following:60

2022 / Global Corruption / 11

-

-

-

The contractor and architectural firm were controlled
by the same individual and were hired without a
competitive bidding process and without a written
contract;
The contractor and architect both tried to bribe him;
The contractor and architect were paying bribes to
local Indian officials with IMB funds;
Sham companies were established to operate the
construction project;
Incomplete job-related invoices;
immediately
available;
An illegal permit obtained from the Indian
government after the IMB represented that the
building would be used for residential rather than
business purposes; and
Substandard workmanship and materials.

When Nollner complained about these observations to his
were potentially complicit in the scam. After complaining
asked him to resign. When Nollner refused to resign, IMB
terminated his employment claiming that his position was no
longer necessary.61
The Nollners sued IMB, claiming they were liable under
Tennessee state law for breach of contract, promissory estoppel
and retaliatory discharge as ell as under federal law for violation
of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (DFA).62 The Nollners asserted that IMB violated the FCPA
by bribing foreign officials and then retaliating against the
Nollners for reporting those violations. They further argued that
the FCPA constitutes a statute subject to SEC jurisdiction, that
Nollner was required to report the FCPA violations by his
employer and that the DFA protected him against retaliation.63
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The court held that the retaliatory discharge claims did
not present a federal question because a state law employment
action did not present a substantial federal question over which
64
Even
if it were shown that the defendants violated the FCPA, a federal
statute does not afford the Nollners a private cause of action and
the Nollners were protected by Tennessee law against
retaliation. The court therefore determined that the FCPA claim
must be dismissed.65

COMPARING U.S. ANTI-BRIBERY ENFORCEMENT
WITH OTHER NATIONS
At the time of the OECD Convention, the U.S.,
Germany, Japan and France were the largest OECD exporters so
if the U.S. is to be compared with other nations with regard to
anti-bribery enforcement, it should be with Germany, France
and Japan.66
Germany, France and Japan depict three different
reactions to global anti-bribery commitments.67 Germany
depicts high-compliance, high-enforcement and a cooperative
relationship with FCPA prosecutors. France, on the other hand,
practices limited anti-bribery enforcement hampered by politics
and conflicted relationship with the FCPA. Japan is a nation with
little anti-bribery enforcement but an open-minded approach to
the FCPA prosecution of its entities.68

-Bribery Enforcement
On a world-wide scale, Germany is number 2 after the
U.S. in anti-bribery enforcement. In 2013, the OECD praised
69
Transparency
International has ranked Germany and the U.S. as active
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enforcers out of active, moderate, limited, or little/no
enforcement. Compliance investigations in Germany are now
commonplace and many German entities are withdrawing from
nations with high corruption risks.70
In 2008, the German company Siemens A.G. agreed to
pay $350 million to the U.S. SEC and $450 million to the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ).71 The U.S. government found that
Siemens had violated the FCPA and the alleged bribes went
from a German entity to nations including Iraq, Israel, Mexico
only German entity to face FCPA enforcement: Daimler AG in
2010, Deutsche Telekom AG in 2011, and Allianz SE in 2012
all paid millions of dollars in settlements for FCPA violations.72
The FCPA enforcement actions in Germany were not the
product of unilateral U.S. action. Siemens paid an additional
estimated $569 million to the German government, which
investigated the entity throu
Office.73 The U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia
announced that the coordination of the U.S. and German law
enforcement set the standard for global cooperation in the fight
against corruption.74 The DOJ noted that the OECD Convention
legal assistance provisions enabled the collaboration between
75
All of this
evidence indicates that Germany has a positive, working
relationship with the FCPA in parallel to its own corruption
proceedings.

-Bribery Enforcement
France has a poor record when it comes to convicting
French companies for foreign bribery. Since the OECD
Convention, France has prosecuted five foreign bribery schemes
but none of them resulted in convictions.76 Since 2012, France
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has opened twenty-four foreign corruption proceedings but only
three people have been prosecuted as a result. As opposed to
Germany, the OECD considers France to be insufficiently
compliant with the Anti-Bribery Convention.77
Transparency International has categorized foreign
bribery prosecution in France a limited enforcement nation,
citing a lack of prosecutorial independence.78 Statutory law
hampers anti-bribery enforcement in France. France has a dual
criminality requirement for foreign bribery so the bribery must
be an offence in both nations in order to enable French
prosecution. Furthermore, unless the offender or victim is a
French national, France will not assert jurisdiction in bribery
schemes so entities get around French criminal liability by
79

strained. The DOJ settled with Total in 2013 while Parisian
judges in 2014 just decided that Total should be put on trial in
France.80 Data protection has been problematic for FCPA
enforcement. The French Data Protection Act applies to all
activity in a French territory and the Commission nationale de
a
transfers to the U.S. These data transfers include information on
criminal records, which are needed in establishing bribery
relationships during FCPA enforcement proceedings.81 If
anyone tries to investigate potential business partners in France,
that person may be unable to obtain the information needed to
payments.82
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-Bribery Enforcement
Japan faced strong OECD criticism for its insufficient
anti-bribery enforcement.83 While Japan has the third largest
economy in the world with robust import and export businesses,
it has only prosecuted four corruption schemes since the OECD
Convention.84 Transparency International ranked Japan as a
possible.85
The OECD identified a number of specific concerns
lack of resources targeted for the purpose of detecting,
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry has not defined what
comprises a facilitation payment versus a bribe. Lastly, Japan
rs are trained to identify
miscellaneous tax return expenses that are actually suspicious
payments.86 While France has problems in obtaining
convictions, Japan has problems setting up investigations.
In 2011, the DOJ charged JGC corporation for
authorizing a joint venture to hire agents that would pay bribes
to Nigerian government officials in order to obtain contracts.87
through a vicarious liability theory through an American jointventure partner. JGC paid $218.8 million in exchange for a
deferred prosecution agreement.88
provided any official support to the U.S. prosecutors during the
FCPA enforcement case of JGC. In the JGC case, the U.S. cited
significant assistance from France, Italy, Switzerland and the
U.K. but no mention of Japan.89
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Compliance and the Free Rider Problem
Why would the U.S., Germany, France and Japan have
such different approaches towards anti-bribery enforcement?
Many nations are concerned that by implementing the FCPA,
their companies may lose business opportunities to those
companies that can offer bribes without any repercussions.
While a nation may agree that bribery is bad, it does not want to
bear the cost of implementing an anti-bribery legal regime at an
economic cost to its companies. But nations that do prosecute
benefitting from their anti-bribery enforcement and this causes
a free rider problem.90
Free riding occurs when
costs of receiving a non-excludable good. Anti-corruption
enforcement creates a non-excludable good because nations that
-corruption regimes still
benefit from the enforcement by other nations. This benefit is
twofold.91
First, the non-enforcing nation saves resources while
other nations prosecute corrupt entities that affect the nonenforcing nation. Corruption causes economic inefficiencies by
shifting resources to the corrupt project with the best bribe rather
than the best quality.92 When the U.S. prosecutes a corrupt
company in a non-enforcement nation, the prosecution may
force other companies in the non-enforcement nation to consider
ceasing their bribery practices or risk FCPA prosecutions.
Second, a non-enforcing nation can giver their
companies a competitive edge abroad. These corporations can
use bribery to win contracts or avoid legal barriers while
fear of FCPA prosecution. Once the number of competing
nations implement anti-bribery legal structures, the non-
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enforcing nation can start to prosecute bribery without the fear
that its companies will lose competitors paying bribes.93
This leads to the question as to whether the U.S. should
have investigated and prosecuted the Azerbaijan Oil
Privatization, the Nigerian Who is the Bribe-Taker and the India
Retaliatory Discharge cases and other such cases involving nonenforcing nations. If Azerbaijan, Nigeria, India, France and
and prosecutes corruption, why should the U.S. take on the costs
of doing the work of other nations?
One way the U.S. can combat corruption is by placing
restrictions of foreign assistance. For example, appropriated
funds are to be made available for direct assistance to foreign
g
and the receiving government cooperates with the U.S. and uses
competitive procurement systems and effective monitoring and
evaluation processes, among other requirements.94 Unless the
receiving government effectively investigates and prosecutes
corruption within its own national borders, that receiving
This could be a
solution to the free rider problem.

CONCLUSION
For two decades, the global community has agreed that
nations must combat foreign bribery. But dramatic differences
exist in foreign bribery investigations and prosecutions even
among nations that have signed the OECD Convention. Many
have claimed that the U.S. is too broad when it comes to
investigating and prosecuting corruption abroad while other
nations are too passive when combating corruption within their
own borders.
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Enforcement of anti-bribery laws aimed at global
corruption remains in infancy outside the U.S. with the notable
exception of Germany. Many nations are afraid of losing
business opportunities as a result of implementing the FCPA so
they are reluctant to investigate and prosecute bribery cases in
their own jurisdictions. While there is evidence that initiatives
under the OECD Convention are becoming more effective in
deterring corruption by signatory nations, more needs to be
done.
Inevitably, multi-national cooperation and coordination
will be vital to global bribery in the future. There must be a
global harmonization of the existing mechanisms that are used
to investigate and prosecute corruption. Eradicating bribery and
the free-rider problem, which cause the harmful distortion of
global markets, is a vital step in creating a less corrupt
international business environment.
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